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Abstract: Data security in a mobile context is a critical issue. Over the last few 
years a new category of location-based services, the Enterprise LBS (ELBS), 
has emerged focusing on the demands of mobility in organisations. These 
applications pose challenging requirements, including the need of selective 
access to ELBS based on the position of mobile users and spatially bounded 
organisational roles. To deal with these requirements a novel access control 
system, named GEO-RBAC, has been developed. GEO-RBAC extends the 
NIST RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) standard with the notions of spatial 
role, role-dependent position, role schema and role instance. Further, roles 
become enabled/disabled based on the position of the user. In the paper we 
present GEO-RBAC, a full-fledged RBAC-based model, consisting, like 
RBAC, of three distinct components: the Core GEO-RBAC, the Hierarchical 
GEO-RBAC and the Constrained GEO-RBAC. The paper focuses on  
the innovative aspects that have been introduced in the model to account for the 
spatial dimension. Further, a rigorous specification of the model (reference 
model) is presented. 
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1 Introduction 
The rapid evolution in the technologies for wireless communication and position 
determination has pushed the demand for location-aware applications and in particular 
Location-Based Services (LBS). LBS are services that integrate a mobile device’s 
location with other information so as to provide added value to the user (Spiekermann, 
2004). A popular LBS is the E-911 service, which provides emergency responders with 
the location of the phone caller. Over the past few years, in addition to the LBS for the 
consumer market, a new category of services, the Enterprise LBS (ELBS), has emerged 
focusing on the demands of mobility in organisations. ELBS are becoming increasingly 
relevant and a significant and rapid growth of the market is estimated in the near future. 
Among the enterprises that deploy ELBS, we include, however, not only the companies 
operating in the field and using ELBS for mobile resource management and tracking but 
also the various communities whose members, because of their functional role in the 
organisation, need to access the common information resources through LBS. Healthcare 
and leisure organisations belong to this category as well as military organisations and 
civilian coalitions created in response to a crisis, e.g. natural disasters. 
Despite the increasing interest in ELBS, little attention has been generally paid to 
understand the security requirements that the organisational dimension introduces with 
respect to LBS applications, which is what we focus on here. To introduce the problem 
we first present a possible usage scenario: consider an LBS application for a university 
campus. The campus consists of various buildings and areas, such as departments, 
libraries and recreative areas, each occupying a position in space. From an organisational 
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point of view, people in the campus can play one or more functions, such as teachers, 
students, visitors and, say, library subscribers. The members of the campus are connected 
to a wireless network and equipped with a location-aware PDA by using which they 
access various LBS services. Since the PDA displays the services that are available at 
each instant, the user can select what service to request. John is a student and also a 
library subscriber. When located within one of the libraries of the campus, John is 
presented with various services, not necessarily location-based, e.g. the book-loan service 
to request the loan of a book. As John leaves the library such services are no longer 
available until he entered some library again. John, however, as a student can also request 
the class-timetable from whatever position in the campus extent, because the service is 
provided only to the students in the campus. This scenario allows us to point out some 
important requirements: 
? In enterprises the mobile members are characterised not only by an identity but also 
by an organisational function that is a role. Broadly speaking, a role is a set of rights 
and duties denoted by a name and assigned to a subject who plays that role (Moffett 
and Lupu, 1999). Depending on the roles, the information resources that the 
individuals need may vary and thus also the services to be provided by the LBS 
application. It seems thus reasonable to devise different services based on the 
requester’s roles. This calls for the development of access control mechanisms 
supporting the specification of which user can access which service in which context, 
based also on the user’s role. 
? The services that the user can request at a given instant of time depend both on the 
position and on the user’s role. In the running example, John, when located within 
the library, can request the loan of a book because subscriber of the library.  
It seems thus important to associate a spatial context with each role in order to define 
where the role of the individual is recognised and thus which services can be invoked 
in that position. Further, it seems natural to define such a context in terms of a 
semantic space, that is a space, which besides a geometric extent has also a meaning, 
like the library in the example. 
? The space in which the mobile user is embedded is bounded. Space is bounded for a 
variety of reasons, because of application-dependent constraints, for example, the 
boundaries of the campus; because of technological constraints, such as the network 
extent; because of marketing reasons (i.e. the broader the area covered by the 
service, more the user shall pay) or because of security reasons as such in the case of 
services in a military base. It follows that the spatial context of a role r is limited as 
well; thus the user is recognised to play role r only if located inside the spatial 
context. It is thus necessary to account for the fact that the roles may be effective or 
not depending on the user’s position. 
? Spatial roles should to be defined not only at different semantic details but also over 
extents that have different sizes. In the running example, the campus represents the 
spatial extent of the role CampusMember, while the library is the extent of the role 
LibrarySubscriber. Further, since a user can play more than one role, it seems 
important to prevent a user from playing roles that are conflicting over the same or 
interrelated space, like the roles of student and teacher at the same department. 
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To deal with these requirements and in particular to regulate the access to services based 
on the position of users in a bounded space, we present a comprehensive access control 
model called GEO-RBAC, based on the RBAC model (Role-Based Access Control 
Model) (Ferraiolo et al. 2001). In the past few years, the RBAC model has gained general 
acceptance as the leading model for access control in networked applications. 
Furthermore, it has been recently approved as a standard by the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) and a number of organisations are today applying this 
standard in specialised domains. Nevertheless, the utilisation of RBAC for the controlled 
access to spatial resources, especially in innovative applications such as LBS and mobile 
applications, has become a research theme only in recent times. 
The model we present results from the extension of the GEO-RBAC model reported 
in Bertino et al., (2005). The basic concept underlying GEO-RBAC is that of spatial role,
that is a role which is assigned a spatial context, defined by a region in space. In addition, 
besides denoting a set of permissions as in the classical RBAC, a spatial role is 
characterised by a status, which is enabled or disabled depending on the position of the 
user. As the user moves across different spatial contexts, the status of roles may change 
as well and thus also the permissions which may be granted to the user because of the 
enabled roles. A permission corresponds to a service. Thus saying that a permission prm
is granted to a role r means that the users playing role r are authorised to access the 
service corresponding to prm. Ultimately, the set of services which are accessible to a 
user may vary in time, depending on the user’s position. 
The GEO-RBAC, like RBAC, include three distinct components: 
? The Core GEO-RBAC embodies the essential aspects of the model and in particular 
the notion of spatial roles. 
? The Hierarchical GEO-RBAC extends the model with the notion of hierarchies of 
spatial roles. As a novel contribution, the model introduces the distinction between 
replaceable and non-replaceable role. A replaceable role is a role which can be 
replaced by a ‘less powerful’ role in the hierarchy. 
? The Constrained GEO-RBAC introduces static and dynamic separation of duty 
relations to prevent the user from playing two or more conflicting spatial roles, 
possibly in interrelated regions. 
In the paper we provide a complete definition of the components of the GEO-RBAC 
model and point out relevant issues in their development and related solutions. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first complete definition of a spatial RBAC model 
encompassing not only the core concepts but also the hierarchies and constraints. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the Section 2, we introduce some 
preliminaries concepts, in particular the RBAC model and the spatial model adopted in 
GEO-RBAC to represent the position of the user and the spatial characteristics of the 
role. We then present the three components of the model, first informally to enable a 
simpler comprehension of the basic concepts and afterwards in formal terms in order to 
provide a detailed and rigorous description of the Reference Model. Sections 6 and 7 
concern the related work and concluding remarks, respectively. In appendix, in order to 
combine theory and practice and provide the reader with a running specification of the 
model, we report the XML specification of the core component. 
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2 Background 
2.1 RBAC 
The RBAC model, as defined in the NIST standard, consists of four basic sets of 
elements: users, roles, permissions and sessions.
? User is as a human being or an autonomous agent. 
? Role represents the function of a user within a community. The community can be a 
structured organisation, for example, a business enterprise, or a more informal 
community, e.g. the citizens of a city. A role confers a set of permissions on the user. 
? Permission is an approval to perform an operation on one or more objects. An object 
is a resource that shall be protected. An operation is an executable image of a 
program, which upon invocation executes some function for the user over some 
object. The types of operations and objects depend on the application context in 
which RBAC is deployed. For example, in a file system, operations might include 
read, write and execute; in a database management system, operations might include 
insert, delete, append and update. 
? Session, When the user logs in, a session is established during which the user 
activates some subset of roles that he or she is assigned. The permissions available to 
the user of the session are thus the permissions assigned to the roles that are currently 
active across all the users sessions. 
Over the above sets of elements, a number of relations are defined. The User-Assignment
(UA) relates users to roles through a many-to-many relationship; a user can therefore be 
assigned multiple roles and the same role assigned to different users. The Permission-
Assignment (PA) relation relates roles and permissions again through a many-to-many 
relationship; thus a role can be assigned multiple permissions and similarly each 
permission can be assigned to multiple roles. The function SessionUser maps each 
session into a user, whereas the SessionRole function maps a session onto a set of roles, 
namely, the roles that are active in the session. The above sets and relations as a whole 
constitute the basic RBAC layer, the Core RBAC defined as follows: 
Definition 1 (Core RBAC): Core RBAC consists of the following components:
? The sets U, R, PRMS and SES represent the set of users, roles, permissions and 
sessions. We define:
– .UA U R? ? The user-assignment relation that assigns users to roles.
– Assigned User: 2 .UR ? The mapping from a role to a set of users.
– .PA R PRMS? ? The permission-assignment relation that assigns permissions 
to roles.
– Prms Assignment: 2 .PRMSR ? The mapping of a role into a set of permissions.
– Session User: .SES U?  The mapping from a session to a user.
– Session Role: 2 .RSES ? The mapping from a session to a set of roles.
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Core RBAC defines the minimum collection of RBAC elements, element sets and 
relations for a RBAC system to be defined. Besides the Core RBAC, the model consists 
of additional components that can optionally be used: Hierarchical RBAC and 
Constrained RBAC. The Hierarchical RBAC component adds relations for supporting 
role hierarchies. A hierarchy is a partial order defining a seniority relation between roles, 
whereby senior roles acquire the permissions of their juniors. Constrained RBAC adds 
Separation of Duty (SoD) constraints to the RBAC (Ferraiolo et al., 2001). SoD 
constraints are in general used to prevent conflicts of interest in an organisation possibly 
arising because of the usage of conflicting roles. Roles are conflicting if a user can gain 
the authorisation from them to exercise conflicting operations. Two different SoD 
constraints are considered: the static and the dynamic one. Static constraints prevent the 
assignment of conflicting roles to users, so that a user assigned to a given role can never 
be assigned to a role conflicting with the first one; in the dynamic case, the constraints 
enforce the activation of conflicting roles within a user session so that a user cannot have 
conflicting roles active at the same time. 
2.2 The spatial data model 
The spatial data model we adopt is instrumental in representing the position of the user 
and the spatial properties of roles. In compliance with current geo-spatial standards 
(ISO/TC211, 2003), we describe the spatial objects that are located in the reference space 
(SPACE), in terms of simple features (ISO/TC211, 2003) (hereinafter, features). Features 
have an identity, thematic properties and can be mapped onto a position in SPACE. We 
denote a feature through its identifier. For example, UniMi is the identifier of the spatial 
object that describes the properties of a campus and its position. The position of a feature 
is represented through a geometry, which can be of type point, line or polygon or 
recursively a collection of geometries. Further, geometries can be related by different 
types of relationship. Among them, the reference set of topological relations is {Disjoint,
Touch, In, Contains, Equal, Cross, Overlap}. These relations are binary, mutually 
exclusive (if one is true, the others are false), and they are a refinement of the well-known 
set of topological relations proposed by Clementini, Di Felice and van Oosterom (1993). 
To exemplify, the Contains(x, y) relationship between geometries x and y holds when all 
points of y are also points of x. Moreover, features have an application-dependent 
semantics that is expressed through the concept of feature type. A feature type captures 
the intentional meaning of the entity. Examples of feature types: Campus, Department 
and Library. The extension of a feature type is a set of semantically homogeneous 
features. For example, the extension of the feature type Library is the set 
{CentralLibrary, ScientificLib, Humanities}.
3 Overview of the components  
In this section we focus on the distinguishing and innovative concepts of the model, 
especially with respect to RBAC whilst the full definition of the model is presented in 
Section 4. This section is subdivided into three subsections, one for each component of 
the model. 
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3.1 Core-GEO-RBAC  
By adapting the definition in Ferraiolo et al. (2001) to our model, we say that Core GEO-
RBAC defines a minimum collection of elements which are required to completely 
achieve a GEO-RBAC system. The basic notion is that of spatial role, which describes a 
spatially bounded function for a user. Two other concepts, however, are noteworthy:  
(a) the position model, which describes the position of the mobile user; (b) the notions of 
role schema and role instance, which provide a representation of the role at two levels: 
the intensional and the extensional level. We now introduce each of these concepts. 
3.1.1 The position model 
The notion of position is fundamental, since it is one of the characterising aspects of the 
user. Unlike most proposals in mobile computing that describe the position uniquely in 
geometric terms, e.g. a point, we introduce, for sake of flexibility, the distinction between 
the real and the logical position. The real position corresponds to the position of the user 
on Earth acquired through some positioning technology. Real positions can thus be 
represented as geometric elements of different types since, depending on the chosen 
technology and accuracy requirements, they may correspond to points or polygons. 
Conversely, the logical position is defined at a higher level of abstraction to represent 
positions in a way that is almost independent from the underlying positioning technology. 
Further, besides a geometry, the logical position has a semantics. For example, logical 
positions can be a house, an address number or a road which are represented in terms of 
spatial feature types. The logical position is computed from real positions by using a 
location mapping function. For example, a location mapping function can be defined to 
map a position acquired through GPS onto the closer road segment. More formally, given 
a feature type ft, a position mapping function for ft is a mft that, given a real position rp,
returns a logical position corresponding to an instance of ft having rp as real position. As 
we will see, since the localisation may respond to different application requirements, for 
example, with respect to accuracy, the meaning of location may vary depending on the 
role. For example, the position of a generic campus member may be coarsely defined in 
terms of campus sectors, assuming that the campus area is subdivided into sectors, 
whereas the position of the teacher can be represented at a higher resolution by an 
address. 
3.1.2 Spatial role 
The concept of spatial role is the distinguishing aspect of our model. To account for the 
spatial context, a spatial role is defined not only by a name as in RBAC but also by a role 
extent. The extent of a role defines the boundaries of the region contained in the reference 
space. A user, who has been conferred a role r, is thus recognised to effectively play such 
a role only when logically located within the extent of r. For example, CampusMember 
(UniMi) is a spatial role: CampusMember is the role name and UniMi is the role extent, 
specifically the identifier of a spatial feature of type Campus denoting, among the others, 
a polygonal space. An individual, who is a member of the campus, is recognised to play 
the role of CampusMember and thus authorised to invoke the services associated to the 
role, only when located in the polygonal extent of the campus. 
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Each role is assigned a set of permissions. A permission corresponds to a service. For 
example, the service BookLoan of the running example is assigned to the spatial role 
LibarySubscriber(MyLibrary). The terms permission and service are used in this paper in 
an interchangeable way. Like RBAC, when a user connects to the LBS application, a new 
session is started. Then the user selects the roles, among those which have been assigned 
to him/her that he/she wishes to play. This set represents the session roles, and the 
elements of the set are said to be activated. Unlike RBAC, however, in our model session 
roles have a status in addition, which is enabled or disabled. For a session role to be 
enabled, the user should be logically located within the space of the corresponding role 
extent. As the user moves, the status of roles change. Therefore, depending on the 
position of the user, only a subset of the session roles is enabled and permissions granted. 
As a result the set of services which the user can access at a given point in time depends 
both on the session roles and on the position of the user. 
3.1.3 Role schema and instance 
To provide a more compact representation of semantically homogeneous roles defined 
over different extents, we introduce the distinction between role schema and role 
instance. A role instance is a role defined over a specific extent, in compliance with the 
role schema. Note that the terms roles instance and spatial role are used as synonymous. 
A role schema defines some common properties of roles with a similar meaning. 
Specifically, a role schema defines: (a) a common name for a set of roles; (b) the type of 
role extent; (c) the type of logical location; (d) the mapping function relating the real 
position with the logical position. For example; CampusMember (Campus, Sector, msector)
is a schema, the instances of which are roles having the following properties: the roles 
have the same name CampusMember and the logical position of the users is identified by 
a sector of the campus, assuming that the campus is subdivided in zones, which is 
computed by applying function msector to the real position. Once a schema is specified, the 
corresponding instances can be simply created by specifying the role name and its extent, 
for example, CampusMember(UniMi).
Because roles are assigned permissions and because of the two different levels of role 
representation, it seems reasonable to assign permissions to both role schemas and role 
instances. The permissions which are assigned to a schema are then inherited and shared 
by all the instances of the schema. For example, if we assign the service getMap to the 
role schema CampusMember, it means that such a service can be accessed by the 
members of all campus. For the sake of flexibility, however, permissions can also be 
assigned to single role instances. 
3.1.4 Example 
To summarise the characterising aspects of spatial roles, we present an example which 
shows how schemas and instances are specified. 
1 Consider first the set FT of spatial feature types representing the spatial objects of 
interest. For brevity we omit the specification of the instances. 
FT = {Campus, Department, Sector, Library, Address}
2 Role schemas are defined for the members of the campus, the students, the teachers 
and the library subscribers. The CampusMember schema specifies that members are 
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recognised as such when located in a sector of the campus while students and 
teachers are recognised when located in some buildings of a department. Similarly, 
the subscriber of a library is recognised when in a library. 
RoleSchemas = {CampusMember(Campus, Sector, msector), Student(Dept, Building,
nbuilding), Teacher(Dept, Building, nbuilding), LibrarySubscriber(Library, Address,
kaddress)}
3 Role instances are defined for the previous role schemas. Only one instance of the 
CampusMember schema is specified because we assume a unique campus. Two 
instances of the student schema are defined for two departments. Similarly, two roles 
of the LibrarySubscriber schema are defined for two different libraries as follows: 
RoleInstances = {CampusMember(UniMi), Teacher(Dept#1), Teacher(Dept#2),
(Student(Dept#1), Student(Dept#2), LibrarySubscriber(MyLib),
LibrarySubscriber(OtherLib)}
4 Permissions, thus services, are assigned to role schemas and instances. The service 
book-loan of the running example is assigned to the schema of LibrarySubscriber 
and is thus inherited by all instances of the given schema. Instead, the service class-
timetable is assigned to both the schema Teacher and Student. Assume also that the
get-map is a service assigned to the CampusMember schema to provide a service of 
map-based guidance. 
3.2 Hierarchical GEO-RBAC 
Besides Core GEO-RBAC, Hierarchical GEO-RBAC (HGEO-RBAC) has been specified 
as an additional component of the model to support spatial role hierarchies and thus 
simplify both the specification and the management of roles as well as their permissions. 
Spatial role hierarchies are defined by introducing a partial order ? over the set of roles. 
If we say that CampusMember(UniMi) ? Student(Dept#1), we mean that the role 
CampusMember in the campus UniMi is less powerful than the role Student performed at 
the Computer Science Department in the same campus. By less powerful we mean that 
the user has fewer permissions and thus can access fewer services. The introduction of 
hierarchies poses a number of issues. The first is whether the notion of hierarchy is 
applied only to role instances or role schemas or both. The second issue concerns the 
need of re-defining the concept of enabled roles. The two issues are discussed in the 
following. 
3.2.1 Role hierarchies 
For the sake of generality, hierarchies are defined at both extensional and intensional 
level. The first level corresponds to the role instance level whilst the second level to the 
role schema. On one hand, the schema hierarchy simplifies the specification and 
management of roles, since the permissions assigned to schemas are inherited by all the 
descendants in the hierarchy and therefore do not have to be explicitly defined for each 
distinct schema. On the other hand, the instance hierarchy concerns the roles directly 
conferred to the user. Because of the peculiar characteristics of the instance hierarchy, 
here we consider only this aspect. To simplify the introduction of the concept of 
hierarchy, we first describe it through examples. 
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Consider the two roles r1 = CampusMember(UniMi) and r2 = Student(Dept#1). If we 
state that r1 ? r2, it means that: 
? An individual who is a student at Dept#1 is also a member of the campus UniMi.
Therefore, the permissions which are assigned to a campus member are also assigned 
to a student. 
? The role extent of r2 is spatially contained in the role extent of r1, that is, the spatial 
extent of Dept#1 is contained in the spatial extent of UniMi.
? If role r2 is enabled, r1 is also enabled. Moreover, the logical position of the user in 
the role of student is spatially contained in the logical position computed for the 
same user in the role of campus member. 
We represent the hierarchy by extending the notion of role graph (Nyanchama and 
Osbornm, 1999). In particular, we use the role graph to represent the set of roles through 
a lattice in which the nodes represent the roles and the edges represent the precedence 
relationship. In addition to the user-defined roles, every role graph has a MaxRole (?)
and a MinRole (?). MaxRole has assigned the union of all permissions. Further, because 
the role is spatial, it has an extent also. Such extent results from the intersection of all 
extents and can be empty. MaxRole is introduced to ensure that the precedence 
relationship is always defined; however, it is most likely the case that, in order to 
improve security through SoD, no user is assigned the permission to use this role. 
MinRole represents the minimum set of privileges available to all roles, possibly empty. 
Like MaxRole, MinRole has an extent. In this case the extent is the whole reference 
space, that is SPACE.
We draw the role graph without redundant edges through a Hasse diagram. In the 
paper we use the convention that the MinRole is drawn at the top. A role preceding r is an 
ancestor of r. To illustrate first the syntactical aspects of the hierarchy, consider the set of 
generic roles R = {A(s0), B(s1), C(s2), D(s3), E(s4), F(s5)} where X(Ext) denotes the role X
with a spatial extent identified by Ext. Without loosing in generality, we assume that roles 
are univocally identified by their names. Assume A(s0) ?? B(s1); A(s0) ? C(s2); A(s0) ?
F(s5); B(s1) ? D(s3); B(s1) ? E(s4) and C(s2) ? E(s4). The corresponding graph is reported 
in Figure 1a. 
For the sake of readability, in the graphical representation, the nodes of the graph are 
labelled only with roles names. An arrow from X to Y means X ? Y . We assume the role 
extents in Figure 1b. Note that the extents of two non-comparable roles, those roles which 
are not the one ancestor of the other, such as roles B and C, can overlap. Therefore, if a 
user is located in the intersection area of two roles, both of them can be enabled. 
Moreover, it should be noticed that the containment relationship between extents is not a 
sufficient condition for the roles to be comparable, since the role ordering is application-
dependent. In the example, the extent of role F is contained in that of C, but the roles are 
not comparable. 
3.2.2 Semantics of enabled roles 
Because of the spatial context, the introduction of the instance hierarchy introduces a new 
issue. The problem can be formulated as follows: given a set of session roles S and given 
a point p ? SPACE, which are the roles in S which are enabled when the user of the 
session is in position p. With reference to the role graph in Figure 1, assume that the set S
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of session roles consists of the roles S = {D,E}. Which roles are enabled when the user is 
in position p?
Figure 1 (a) Role hierarchy and (b) role extents. 
We claim that there is no unique answer. In the example, we can devise two 
interpretations: (a) the first one is that the set of enabled roles is ER = {D,B,A}. The 
motivation is that p is contained in only one of the two session role extents, in particular 
in the extent of D; therefore, ER contains D as well as its ancestors because of the 
definition of hierarchy, that is B and A; (b) the second interpretation is that  
ER = {D,C,B,A}, which differs from the previous one because of element C. The 
motivation is that p is contained not only in the extent of D but also in the extent of C.
Because C is an ancestor of E, which is a session role, it seems reasonable to include it in 
the set of enabled roles. The intuition behind this second interpretation is that the user not 
only can play the roles that he has selected but also a weaker version of them, represented 
by their ancestors in the role hierarchy. 
The above example shows that, in order to determine the set of enabled roles, we 
have to define what happens if a role is not enabled. As we have seen, there are two 
possible interpretations. Which of them is the most suitable depends on the semantics of 
roles and thus on the requirements of the applications. Therefore, for the sake of 
generality, we propose a model in which the behaviour to adopt is assumed to be specific 
for each role and explicitly defined. When the user is allowed to play, in place of the 
session role r, a weaker role, in the sense discussed above, we say that r is a replaceable 
role (R-role); otherwise, we say that r is a non-replaceable role (NR-role). We call this 
property of the role as replacement property.
3.2.3 A model for R-roles and NR-roles 
To represent the replacement property of a role r, the basic idea is to introduce an 
attribute dist (distance) indicating the maximum distance which is allowed for an ancestor 
to replace the role. Specifically, dist = 0 means that the role cannot be replaced by any 
other role and thus it is a NR-role; if dist > 0, then the role can be replaced by a role at the 
maximum distance dist and therefore it is a R-role. By restricting the value of the distance 
attribute, we can introduce the constraint that a role cannot be replaced by a role that is 
too far, thus too generic. This results in a greater expressivity. 
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We now discuss more specifically how the property is specified. The replacement 
property is described both in the role schema and in the role instance definition, in order 
to characterise the single instance. The role schema is thus extended with the dist 
attribute, which defines whether a role is a R-role or a NR-role. All the instances sharing 
the same schema inherit the same distance value. The general form of the schema for role 
role is as follows: 
Role(ext, loc, mloc, dist)
where dist ? N is the distance that indicates whether the role is replaceable or not. An 
example is the following. Consider a hierarchy stating that the schema Student is more 
powerful than the immediate ancestor, the schema CampusMember. We state that any 
instance of the role Student can be replaced by an instance of CampusMember by 
specifying the following schema: 
Student(Department, Building, m, 1). 
The value 1 assigned to the distance property means that an instance of Student can be 
replaced by an instance of some immediate predecessor in the hierarchy, that is, in the 
example, by an instance of CampusMember.
To enhance flexibility, the value of the property can, however, be specified also for 
single instances. The structure of the role instance is thus extended with an attribute 
labelled dist, which, if not NULL, overrides the value of the corresponding attribute 
defined at schema level. The value defined at schema level is thus the default value for all 
the instances. An example is the role instance: 
Student(Dept#1, 2). 
The value 2 of the distance property overrides the value defined at schema level. The 
specification of the property at instance level is useful to introduce exceptions. 
An important remark to be done is that the introduction of the notion of replaceable 
role arguably affects the algorithm, which determines the set of enabled roles in a session, 
since the location of the user must be confronted not only with session roles, to determine 
which of these are enabled, but eventually also with the ancestors of session roles which 
are R-roles. 
3.3 The constrained GEO-RBAC 
The third component of the model is the Constrained GEO-RBAC, which adds SoD 
relations to the GEO-RBAC model. SoD relations are used to enforce conflict of interest 
policies that the organisations may employ to prevent the users from exceeding a 
reasonable level of authority for their positions (Ferraiolo et al., 2001). Conflicts of 
interest, in particular, arise as a result of the simultaneous assignment of two mutual 
exclusive permissions or roles to the same subject. Following the NIST standard, we 
focus specifically on the constraints specifying the roles to be mutually disjoint. A 
generic constraint is thus expressed as (role_set, n), where n is the number of roles which 
are mutually exclusive in role_set. The precise meaning of role set depends, however, on 
whether the SoD is static or dynamic. A Static Separation of Duty (SSD) constraint 
means that a user cannot be assigned n roles from the given role set. Conversely, a 
Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD) constraint means that a user cannot select, that is 
activate, n roles in a session from the given role set. To deal with the spatial context, 
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however, it seems important to extend the conventional classification of constraints to 
account for the specific characteristics of our model. Two orthogonal criteria, therefore, 
have been introduced that allow us to characterise constraints based on whether they are: 
(a) expressed at instance or schema level; (b) based on spatial criteria or not. By 
combining these two criteria, we obtain four classes of constraints, one of which is not 
meaningful. We discuss first the two criteria and then introduce the proposed 
classification of constraints. 
1 Instance vs. schema-based constraints. At instance level, the constraint is expressed 
by enumerating the roles which are requested to be disjoint. The form of the 
constraint is ({r1, ... rn}, n) with n > 1 where each ri, i = 1, ... n, is a role instance. For 
example, the constraint ({Teacher(Dept#1), Student(Dept#1)}, 2) states that if a user 
is assigned the role of teacher in department Dept#1, he/she cannot be assigned the 
role of student in the same department and vice versa. It can be noticed that the 
members of the role set not only are requested to be known but the set of roles 
should also be modified; because of the addition and removal of elements, it may 
occur that the constraints are to be updated as well. 
If the constraint is defined at schema level, the members of the role set are specified 
intensionally in terms of role schemas. We say that two roles schemas rs1, rs2 are 
mutually disjoint when all the pairs of elements < r1, r2 > with r1 and r2 instances, 
respectively, of rs1 and rs2 are disjoint. The example (Teacher, Student, 2) states that 
a teacher cannot be at the same time a student in any campus and in any department 
within a campus. A constraint defined at schema level enables a more compact 
representation of generalised constraints over sets of roles, that otherwise would 
require a lengthy specification. Further, the constraint is not affected by the 
operations that modify the set of role instances. 
2 Non-spatial vs. spatial constraints. Non-spatial constraints are those which are close 
to the standard RBAC constraints, since they do not consider the spatial dimension 
of roles. The spatial component characterises instead the constraints that are spatial. 
In particular, a constraint is spatial when the roles that are mutually exclusive are 
those which fulfil a given spatial relationships. The intuition is that conflicts of 
interest may arise not only because of the semantics of roles but also because the 
roles are defined over conflicting extents. It is the case, for example, of roles which 
cannot be played over the same region. 
By combining these criteria we obtain four classes of constraints: non-spatial constraints 
at instance and schema level; spatial constraints at instance level and at schema level. As 
we will see, one of these four classes is not meaningful. We characterise each class as 
follows: 
1 Non-spatial constraint at instance level . The purpose of the constraint expressed as 
(role_instance_set, n) is to prevent the user from playing n or more role instances 
among those specified in the role_instance_set. For example, we can state that a 
teacher in campus A cannot be a member of campus B and campus C.
Such constraint is expressed as: ({Teacher(A), CampusMember(B),
CampusMember(C)}, 3). This constraint constitutes the primitive constraint at the 
lowest level of abstraction. It is very similar to the standard SoD constraint in 
RBAC. 
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2 Non-spatial constraint at schema level. The purpose of the constraint expressed as 
(role_schema_set, n) is to prevent the user from playing n distinct role instances 
from n schemas in role_schema_set. An example is the constraint (CampusTeacher,
CampusStudent, 2), which states that an individual cannot be a teacher and a student 
at the same time independent of the campus, thus whatever role instance the user 
plays from the given schemas. The constraint is thus applied to all the possible pairs 
of instances. Notice that this condition could also be formulated by introducing a 
distinct constraint for each pair of instances of teacher and student. The operation, 
however, would result into a large number of constraints expensive to update. 
A particular case occurs when the schemas in the role_schema_set are not distinct. 
Consider the constraint (CampusMember, CampusMember, 2). Based on the 
previous definition, the meaning of the constraint is that an individual cannot play 
two distinct roles of the schema CampusMember, that is she cannot be a member of 
two different campus. This particular case is interesting since it seems reasonable in 
practice to constrain an individual to play a given role in a unique or, however, 
limited number of spatial extents. In order to abbreviate the expression, we express 
the constraint as (role_schema_n). The meaning is that a user cannot play n with n >
1 role instances of the same schema. 
3 Spatial constraint at schema level. The idea is to prevent the user from playing role 
instances of two different schemas if the role extents fulfil a specified spatial 
relationship. The motivation is that because roles are defined over spatial extents, it 
may be the case that conflicts of interest arise when roles are played over nearby 
regions. Without loosing in generality, we assume that the constraint is expressed 
between the pairs of role schemas as follows: (role_schema1, role_schema2,
spatial_rel) where spatial_rel is the spatial relationship which holds between 
instances of role_schema1 and role_schema2. For example, the constraint (Teacher,
Student, Overlaps) means that an individual cannot simultaneously be a teacher and a 
student over overlapping regions (while in disjoint regions, that is campus it is 
allowed). 
Notice that in case of role hierarchies, we have to specify as additional requirement 
that the role schemas role_schema1 and role_schema2 should not be comparable, 
because the hierarchy already introduces a constraint of spatial containment over the 
extents of instances along a path and thus this additional constraint could be 
redundant or inconsistent with the definition of hierarchy. We observe also that a 
spatial constraint defined over role instances, like (Teacher(A), Student(B), 2) has 
little sense since the spatial relationship between the role extents A and B is 
predefined and thus a spatial constraint would be meaningless. 
4 The reference model 
We now introduce a rigorous definition of the model. The purpose is to provide a 
comprehensive definition of the components, thus including all the aspects of the model. 
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4.1 The core GEO-RBAC 
Core GEO-RBAC is presented as organised in a number of logical parts, one for each 
major set of the RBAC model, that is roles, permissions, users, sessions. The general 
structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 2. We use the graphical representation 
adopted for RBAC. In defining the model, we refer to the notation introduced in the 
previous section and summarised in Table 1. 
Figure 2 Core GEO-RBAC 
Table 1 Notation for the main sets used in GEO-RBAC 
Notation Meaning 
FT Feature types 
F Features 
R Role names 
SES Sessions 
U Users
REXT_FT Role extent types 
LPOS_FT Logical positions types 
LPOS Logical positions 
RPOS Real positions 
M Position mapping functions 
OPS Operations 
OBJ Objects 
Preliminarily, we introduce the following function and relation. 
? The position of a feature. Given a feature f, the function LocObj(f) returns a 
geometry if f is a spatial feature or undefined (?) otherwise. 
? Partial ordering of feature types. Let FT be the set of feature types and fti, ftj ? FT,
with i ? j, be two elements of the set. We say that fti is contained in ftj , denoted by  
fti ?ft ftj, if for each feature fi of type fti, a feature fj of type ftj exists such that the 
geometry of fi is contained in the geometry of fj . For example the relation of 
containment between Town and Region is written as Town ?ft Region. As we will 
see, such relationship will be useful in characterising the relationships between 
locations and roles.
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4.2 Role schema and instance 
A role schema defines a common name for a set of roles, the role extent type, the logical 
position type and the position mapping functions, relating the real position with the 
logical position. Formally, 
Definition 2 (Role schema): A Role Schema is a tuple < r, ext, loc,mloc > where:
? r ? R
? ext ? REXT_FT 
? loc ? LPOS_FT 
? loc ?ft ext 
? mloc ? M is a location mapping function for feature type loc. 
We denote with RS the set of role schemas and we assume that, given a role name r ? R, r 
is unique in RS.
An example of role schema is the tuple < CampusMember, Campus, Sector, msector > 
in which CampusMember is the name of the role; Campus is the type of role extent; 
Sector is the type of the logical position, represented by a sector of the campus; finally, 
msector is the position mapping function that maps a real position into one of the sectors of 
the campus. For the sake of readability, a role schema is written as CampusMember 
(Campus, Sector, msector).
Definition 3 (Role instance): Given a role schema rs ? RS, an instance ri of rs is a pair 
< r, e > where r is the name of the role in schema rs; thus r = rs.r and e ? F is a feature 
of type rs.ext. The schema of ri is denoted by SchemaOf (ri). We denote with RI the set of 
role instances for all role schemas. 
A role instance, e.g. < CampusMember, UniMi > is written as CampusMember (UniMi).
4.2.1 Permission 
A permission is associated with each service. In our model, permissions can be associated 
either with the role schema and inherited by all role instances of the schema or directly 
with the role instances. Such different granularities are formalised by introducing two 
functions: S_PrmsAssignment, relating role schemas and permission sets; 
I_PrmsAssignment relating spatial roles, thus role instances, to specific permissions. 
Function I_PrmsAssignment* is then introduced to combine the permissions directly 
assigned to spatial roles with the permissions inherited from their role schema. 
Definition 4 (Permissions) The set of permissions PRMS is defined as  
PRMS = 2(OPS ? OBJ). We also define:
? SPAS: RS ? PRMS, a many-to-many mapping permission-to-spatial role schema 
assignment relation.
? S_PrmsAssignment: RS ? 2PRMS, the mapping of spatial role schema onto a set of 
permissions. Given a role schema rs, S_PrmsAssignment(rs) = {p ? PRMS? < rs, p >
? SPAS}.
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? SPAI: RI ? PRMS, a many-to-many mapping permission-to-spatial role instance 
assignment relation.
? I_PrmsAssignment: RI ? 2PRMS the mapping of spatial role instance onto a set of 
permissions. Given a role instance ri, I_PrmsAssignment(ri) = {p ? PRMS? < ri, p 
>? SPAI}.
? I_PrmsAssignment*: RI ? 2PRMS such that given a role instance ri,
I_PrmsAssignment*(ri) = I_PrmsAssignment(ri)S_PrmsAssignment(SchemaOf 
(ri))}. Hence the permissions of a role are those assigned to its schema plus those 
directly assigned to the instance. 
4.2.2 Users and session 
Spatial roles are assigned to the users. The definition of the model for this part is 
conceptually analogous to that in RBAC. In particular, given a set of users, the following 
relations are defined: the many-to-many relation SU A relates users and role instances; 
the function SR_AssignedUser maps a role instance onto the set of users which can 
activate that role. More formally: 
Definition 5 (Users) We define: 
? SU A ? U × RI , a mapping user-to-spatial role instance assignment relation.
? SR_AssignedUser: RI? 2U, the mapping of spatial role instance onto a set of users. 
Formally SR_AssignedUser(< r, e >? RI ) = {u ? U|(u,< r, e >) ? SU A}.
When a user logs in, a new session is activated and a number of roles are selected to be 
included in the session role set. Given a session s, the following two functions are 
defined: SessionUser(s) corresponds to the user of the session; SessionRoles(s)
corresponds to the role that can be potentially activated in s. Formally: 
Definition 6 (Sessions): We define: 
? SessionUser: SES?U, the mapping from a session s to the user of s.
? SessionRoles: 2 IRSES ? with SessionRoles (s) ? {< r, e >? RI|(SessionUser (s),
< r, e >) ? SU A}.
4.3 Access control mechanism 
The session roles are the roles that the user of the session has selected. However, for a 
session role to be enabled, the user should logically be located within the space of the 
corresponding role extent. Therefore, depending on the user position during that session, 
only a subset of the session roles is enabled and permissions granted. In order to compute 
the logical position of a user playing a role r in a session, the location mapping function 
defined in the schema of r is applied to the user real position, provided by the external 
environment. Hence, if the logical position of the user is spatially contained in the extent 
of r, the role is enabled and thus the set of permissions assigned to the corresponding role 
is determined. Given a user’s request, the access control mechanism determines whether 
the permission requested by the user belongs to the set of permission associated with the 
set of enabled roles ER. If it is the case the permission is granted, otherwise it is rejected. 
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The set of enabled roles ER in session s and real position rp is computed by the function 
EnabledSessionRole (s, rp).
Definition 7 (Authorisation control function): An access request is a tuple ar = ?s, rp,
p, o? ? SES × RPOS × OPS × OBJ. ar can be satisfied at position rp ? RPOS if 
( , )
( , ) _ *( ).
y EnabledSessionRoles s rp
p o I PrmsAssignment y
?
? ?
4.4 Hierarchical GEO-RBAC 
The Hierarchical GEO-RBAC introduces a number of additional concepts, in particular 
the notions of: (a) schema and instance hierarchy; (b) the notion of replaceable and  
non-replaceable role. These aspects are formally defined as follows. 
4.4.1 Schema and instance hierarchy 
A schema hierarchy is a partial order defined over the set of role schemas. The function  
S_AuthorisedPrms is defined, which computed the set of permissions granted to and 
inherited by a role. 
Definition 8 (Schema hierarchy): Let RS be the set of role schemas. A schema hierarchy 
RHs is defined as follows: 
1 RHs ? RS × RS is a partial order over RS, denoted by s? . If 1sr s? 2sr  holds, then 
the role extent type in 
2s
r  is contained in the role extent type of 
1s
r  and similarly the 
logical position type in 
2s
r  is contained in the role extent type of 
1s





.sr ext, and 2 .sr loc ?ft 1 .sr loc. 
2 S_AuthorisedPrms: RS? 2PRMS such that, given a role schema rs,
S_AuthorisedPrms(rs) returns all permissions assigned to rs and to all its ancestors, 
that is S_AuthorisedPrms ( ) { | , , }s s s s s Sr p PRMS r r r p SPA? ?? ? ? ??? .
An instance hierarchy is a partial order over the set of role instances. The function 
I_AuthorisedPrms computes the set of permissions granted to a role instance. The 
function I_AuthorisedUsers returns the set of user assigned to a role instance. Note that, 
however, a relationship is defined between the two hierarchies. The definition of instance 
hierarchy is given as follows. 
Definition 9 (Instance hierarchy): Let RI be the set of role instances. An instance 
hierarchy RHi is defined as follows: 
1 RHi ? RI × RI , a partial order over RI , denoted by i? . The following properties 
hold: 
? < r1, e1 > i? <r2, e2> holds if SchemaOf (<r1, e1>) s?  SchemaOf (<r2, e2 >) and 
LocObj(e2) ? LocObj (e1).
      
      
   Data security in location-aware applications 23    
      
      
      
? Given <r2, e2> and RS2 = SchemaOf (<r2, e2>) if RS1 ?  RS2, then a role <r1, e1>
exists with RS1 = SchemaOf (<r1, e1>).
2 I_AuthorisedPrms: RI? 2PRMS such that, given a role instance ri, I_AuthorisedPrms 
(ri) returns all permissions assigned to ri and to all its ancestors, that is 
I_AuthorisedPrms ( ) { | ,i i i ir p PRMS r r p?? ? ?? I_PrmsAssignment* (ri´)}.
3 I_AuthorisedUsers: RI?2U such that, given a role instance ri, I_AuthorisedUsers 
(ri) returns all users assigned to ri and to all its descendants, that is 
I_AuthorisedUsers *( ) { | , , }i i i i ir u U r r u r SU A? ?? ? ? ??? .
4.4.2 Representation of R-roles and NR-roles 
The second aspect we consider is the formalisation of the replacement property. The 
replacement property is specified both in the role schema, to make it possible applying 
the property to all the instances of a role, and in the role instance definition, in order to 
characterise the single instance. 
The role schema is thus extended with the dist attribute, which defines whether a role 
is a R-role or a NR-role. All the instances sharing the same schema inherit the same 
distance value. To enhance flexibility, the value of the property can, however, be 
specified for single instances also. The structure of the role instance is thus extended with 
an attribute labelled dist which, if not NULL, overrides the value of the corresponding 
attribute defined at schema level. The definition of the extended schema and role instance 
is given next. 
Definition 10 (Extended role schema): An extended role schema is the tuple < r, ext,
loc, mloc, dist > where: dist ? N is the distance which indicates whether the role is 
replaceable or not; dist = 0 means that the role is a NR-role, dist > 0 means that the role 
is a R-role which can be replaced by any ancestor at a maximum distance dist from the 
role. 
Consider the following example based on the role graph in Figure 1a. Assume a 
possible schema for role E: < E, ExtE, LocE, mE, 1 >. In this case, role E is a R-role since 
the distance is 1. It means that, unless differently specified, all role instances of E have 
the same value for the replacement property. Specifically, the instances of E can be 
replaced by the role instances at most at distance 1, that is those denoted as B and C. Note 
that a single role can be replaced by one or more roles. Further, a role cannot be replaced 
by the ? role.
Definition 11 (Extended role instance): Given a role schema rs, an instance ri of rs is a 
triple < r, e, dist > where: r is the name of the role in schema rs; e ? F is a spatial feature 
of the type specified in the role schema, that is rs.ext; dist ? N the distance, as defined 
earlier. It should be noticed that the distance property for the specific instance or 
undefined (NULL).
4.5 Constrained GEO-RBAC 
We now present the formal representation of the SoD constraints. We recall that a SoD 
constraint is defined as a pair (role_set, n). From Section 4.4, we recall also that in our 
model the following classes of constraints have been devised: 
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1 non-spatial constraint at instance level 
2 non-spatial constraint at schema level 
3 spatial constraint at schema level 
The general structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 3. We extend the graphical 
representation adopted in RBAC by considering the constraints at schema level also. 
Figure 3 Constrained GEO-RBAC 
We first provide the definition of the constraints interpreted as static SoD constraints. 
Then we describe the extension to the dynamic SoD. Some system functions are 
introduced to support the subsequent definitions. In particular, we introduce the 
functions: 
? Ext(S): returns the set of role instances of schema S. 
? AreRelated (r1, r2, rel): returns true if the spatial relationship rel holds between the 
geometries of the extents of roles r1 and r2.
4.5.1 Static separation of duty – SSD 
The first type of constraints we consider are the non-spatial constraints defined at 
instance level. These constraints are those which more closely resemble the classical 
RBAC SSD constraints. 
Definition 12 (Non-spatial constraint at instance level): Let RoleSet = {r1, …, rk} be a 
set of role instances. The constraint (RoleSet, n), n > 1, is satisfied if for any subset h of 
RoleSet having cardinality at least n; no user has been assigned to all roles in the subset. 
Formally: 
,| | _ ( ) 0
r h
h RoleSet h n SR AssignedUsers r
?
? ? ? ? ??
Example 1 Consider the set RoleSet = {CampusMember(A),CampusMember(B),
CampusMember(C)}. According to the Definition 12, the constraint (RoleSet, 2) means 
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that an individual cannot be a member of two or more campuses among those specified in 
RoleSet. Note that the roles can be instances of either the same or different schemas. 
The next type of constraints we consider are the non-spatial constraints defined at 
schema level. Basically, a constraint states that an individual cannot play roles from some 
given schemas. We distinguish two cases: in the first case, the set of role schemas which 
is specified in the constraint consists of two or more schemas; in the second case, the 
constraint is specified on a single schema. 
Definition 13 (Non-spatial constraint at schema level): Let SchemaSet = {SR1, …,
SRm} be a set of role schemas with SRi ? SRj for i ? j. We distinguish two cases depending 
on the cardinality of SchemaSet. The constraint (SchemaSet, n), n > 1, is satisfied if: 
Case A: | SchemaSet |? 2 
for any subset of SchemaSet having cardinality at least n; no user has been assigned 
at least one role for each schema in the subset. 
Case B: | SchemaSet|= 1 
Let {SR} be the unique schema in SchemaSet. Then no user has been assigned at 




{ , , } ,|
( _ ( )) 0
k
i j
k j r Ext SR
s SR SR SchemaSet s n
SR AssignedUsers r
? ? ?





( ),| | , _ ( ) 0
r h
h Ext SR h n SR AssignedUsers r
?
? ? ? ? ? ??
Example 2 Consider the role schema {CampusDirector (Campus, Sector, mSector)}. The 
constraint (CampusDirector, 2) means that an individual cannot be a director of two or 
more different campuses. Notice that since the schema denotes a set of roles, the 
definition is similar to Definition 12. 
The last type of constraints we discuss are the spatial constraints defined at schema 
level. In this case the constraint states that an individual cannot play any pair of roles of 
some given schemas satisfying a specified spatial condition. The spatial relationships we 
consider in particular are the topological relationships, because they are more relevant in 
real applications. 
Definition 14 (Spatial constraint at schema level): Let SR1 and SR2 be two role 
schemas and Rel a spatial relationship. The constraint (SR1, SR2, Rel) is satisfied if no 
user is assigned to any role of schema SR1 and any role of schema SR2 satisfying the 
spatial relationship Rel. Formally: 
?1 2( ), ( )( , , )
_ ( ) _ ( ) 0
x Ext SR y Ext SR
AreRelated x y Rel True
SR AssignedUser x SR AssignedUsers y
? ? ? ? ??
? ??
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Note that in case of role hierarchies, the function that computes the set of users which 
have been assigned a given role is the function SR_AuthorisedUsers (in place of 
SR_AssignedUsers).
Example 3 The constraint: 
 (CampusTeacher (Campus, Sector, mSector), CampusStudent (Campus, Sector, mSector),
Overlap)
means that an individual cannot be assigned to two roles, teacher and student, over 
overlapping regions. 
4.5.2 Dynamic separation of duty 
Now we define the meaning of the constraints interpreted as DSD constraints. Basically, 
what changes under this interpretation with respect to the static one is that the constraints 
concern the roles which are activated in a session. The meaning of each class of 
constraints is reported in the following: 
Definition 15 (Non-spatial constraint at instance level): Let RoleSet = {r1, …, rk} be a 
set of role instances. The constraint (RoleSet, n), n > 1, is satisfied if there is no session 
in which at least n roles from the role set have been activated. Formally: 
, , ( )} | |t SES h RoleSet h SessionRoles t h n? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Example 4 With reference to the role set presented in the Example 1, the constraint 
(RoleSet, 2) means that an individual cannot activate two or more campus membership 
roles among those specified in RoleSet. Note that the user can be assigned different roles 
of the schema CampusMember. 
Definition 16 (Non-spatial constraint at schema level): Let SchemaSet = {SR1, …,
SRm} be a set of role schemas with SRi ? SRj for i ? j. We distinguish two cases 
depending on the cardinality of SchemaSet. The constraint (SchemaSet, n), n > 1, is 
satisfied if: 
Case A: | SchemaSet |? 2 
 There is no session in which at least n roles, one for each different schema from 
SchemaSet, have been activated. 
Case B: | SchemaSet |= 1 
 Let {SR} be the unique schema of SchemaSet. There is no session in which at least n 
different role instances of SR have been activated. 
Formally: 
Case A: 
, { , ..., } ,
{ , ..., }, ( ), ..., ( ), | |
( )
i j
i j i i j j
t SES s SR SR SchemaSet
h r r r Ext SR r Ext SR h n
h SessionRoles t
? ? ? ? ? ??? ? ? ? ? ??
?? ?
Case B: 
, ( ), ( ) | |t SES h Ext SR h SessionRoles t h n? ? ? ? ? ? ?
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Example 5 With reference to the schema set presented in the Example 2, the constraint 
(SchemaSet, 2) means that an individual cannot activate two or more CampusDirector
roles. 
Definition 17 (Spatial constraint at schema level): Let SR1 and SR2 be two role 
schemas and Rel a spatial relationship. The constraint (SR1, SR2, Rel) is satisfied if there 
is no session in which roles x and y of schema, SR1 and SR2, respectively, satisfying the 
spatial relationship Rel have been activated simultaneously. Formally: 
?1 2( ), ( ) { , } ( ), ( , , )? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ?x Ext SR y Ext SR x y SessionRoles tt SES AreRelated x y Rel True
Example 6 With reference to the schema set presented in Example 3, the constraint 
means that an individual can be assigned to the roles of teacher and student even if they 
are over overlapping regions, but he/she cannot activate more than one of both these 
roles.
Finally, we can observe that the class of spatial constraints at schema level, defined 
both at static and dynamic level, significantly increase the expressivity of the model 
because the SoD constraints are specified over sets of roles that are defined intensionally 
based on spatial conditions on role extents. 
5 Open issues: location privacy 
Data security in Enterprise LBS is an important issue and GEO-RBAC represents a 
possible approach. However, with the large deployment of LBS and the improvements in 
accuracy and precision of positioning systems, another important issue is related to 
location privacy. Location privacy can be defined as the ability to prevent other parties 
from learning one’s current or past location (Beresford and Stajano, 2003). A threat to 
location privacy thus occurs when an adversary can obtain an individual’s location 
information and can identify the individual. 
We illustrate the concept through an example. Consider a table describing (a) the 
identifier of users and (b) the position of users, represented at the level of precision 
enabled by the positioning technology, for instance, as points of coordinates (x,y). Even 
though the identity of the user is striped off, the information about who is where can still 
be determined if location can spatially be associated with an external database. For 
example, if we know that somebody is at point P and from another database that in the 
region A containing P there is a unique individual, say S, we can infer that S is located in 
P. In this case, data association is simply computed through an operation of spatial join. 
To reduce the risk of threats to location privacy, a possible approach is based on the 
use of k-anonymity techniques (Sweeney, 2002). In conventional databases, k-
anonymisation is a property defined for tables. In particular, given a table t containing the 
user-identifying properties and sensitive data (say, medical diseases), t is defined to be k-
anonymous when each value of the identifying properties appears at least k times in t. For 
example, if the identifying property is the postal code, each value of the postal code can 
be perturbed by reducing the number of digits so that there are at least k tuples with the 
same value of postal code. In this way, the actual identity of user is hidden in a set of 
peers. Further, parameter k defines a metric for the degree of privacy. 
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Recently, extensions of such techniques have been proposed to deal with location 
privacy. In particular, in Gruteser and Grunwald (2003) the notion of k-anonymity has 
been reformulated as follows: a subject is k-anonymous with respect to location 
information, if and only if the location information is indistinguishable from the location 
information of at least k-1 other subjects. The method which has thus been proposed to 
make locations undistinguishable is to replace the actual position with a coarse position. 
The coarse position is obtained by subdividing the space in rectangles each containing at 
least k elements. A similar approach, based on the idea of coarsening the position of the 
user but relying on a different technique, is proposed in Gedik and Liu (2005). In this 
case, the idea is to account not only for the spatial dimension but also for the temporal 
dimension. The coarsening operation is thus applied to the position in time and in place. 
Research on location privacy is, though at early stage, rapidly progressing. One of the 
future challenges is the development of a unique framework for data security and location 
privacy support. In that perspective, one of the concepts that can probably be exploited to 
deal with both issues is that of spatial and temporal granularity. 
We conclude with a final remark. So far, we have discussed location privacy focusing 
on the technical issues. However, the socio-technical aspects are a fundamental 
dimension of the problem (Thomas and Sandhu, 2004). In this perspective it would be 
interesting to consider if Enterprise LBS, because of the organisational setting, pose 
specific requirements with respect to location privacy. To our knowledge this issue has 
not been considered yet. 
6 Related work 
The development of spatially aware access control systems is an emerging research issue 
spanning several fields. In geographical information systems research area, the demand 
for spatially aware access control systems is primarily motivated by the increased 
concern for geographical information sharing. To our knowledge, the first access control 
model for geographical data has been proposed in Atluri and Mazzoleni (2002); Chun 
and Atluri (2000) only deals with satellite image maps. On the other hand, an access 
control system for geometric and vector-based spatial data has been proposed in Bertino, 
Damiani and Momini (2003). The model introduces the concept of spatial authorisation 
as an authorisation that can be defined only on portions of space. When an access request 
is made for an object, the system checks whether the requested object lies in the 
authorisation space and if this is the case, it grants the access. This model has been 
applied to support controlled access to spatial data on web. The underlying spatial data 
model is, however, relatively simple and does not address important issues such as the 
multi-granularity of spatial data. A similar architecture, but focused on XML-based 
representation of spatial data, has been proposed in Purevjii et al. (2004). A more 
complex spatial data model has been assumed in Belussi et al. (2004). In this work, an 
access control system is presented that allows the specification of authorisation rules to 
access complex-structured spatial data stored in a DBMS and organised according to 
multiple spatial representation levels and at multiple granularities. The system, however, 
does not deal with geographically bounded roles neither with mobile users. The position 
of users is considered in access control models securing mobile and context-aware 
applications. In IEEE 2003 Conference Hansen and Oleshchuk (2003 a,b) an extension of 
RBAC is proposed based on the notion of spatial role, intended as a role that is 
      
      
   Data security in location-aware applications 29    
      
      
      
automatically activated when the user is in a given position. The space model is, 
however, very simple and targeted to wireless network applications. It consists of a set of 
adjacent cells and the position of the user is the cell or the aggregate of cells containing it. 
The spatial granularity of the position is thus fixed while the space is rigidly structured 
and the position itself does not have any semantic meaning but simply a geometric value. 
By contrast, in our model the granularity of the user position may depend on the role of 
the user; thus no assumption is made on the space layout. Moreover, the spatial 
dimension integrates geometric and semantic knowledge about the world. User position 
can be considered as a state variable in access control systems based on the notion of 
context (Covington, Moyer and Ahamad, 2000; Covington et al., 2001; Sampemane, 
Naldurg and Campbell, 2002; Cuppens and Miège, 2003). Of particular interest is the 
access control system proposed in Covington et al. (2001), Covington, Moyer and 
Ahamad (2000), introducing the concept of environment roles. Roles can be activated 
based on the value of conditions in the environment where the request has been made. 
Environmental conditions include time, location and other contextual information that is 
relevant to access control. If compared with GEO-RBAC, the concepts of role extent and 
user position are close to that of context variables. However, the mechanism of contexts 
is very general and does not account for the specificity of spatial information, such as the 
multi-granularity of position and the spatial relationships that may exist between the 
spatial elements in space. Moreover, in GEO-RBAC a common spatial data model is 
adopted in order to provide a uniform and standard-based representation of locational 
aspects that, notably, involve not only the roles but also the protected objects. 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented GEO-RBAC, an extension of the RBAC model 
addressing access control requirement in spatial and location-based information. Unlike 
other proposals of spatially aware access control models, GEO-RBAC relies on geo-
spatial standards to model objects, user positions and geographically bounded roles, 
making the approach quite standard and flexible. Another important characteristic of the 
model is the ability to represent the concept of position at different levels of abstraction 
which are also role-dependent. This may be very useful to protect location privacy, 
because the position of the user can be specified at different levels of granularity and thus 
of positional uncertainty. Further, by introducing the concept of role schema, role extents 
and logical positions can be customised, depending on the function the role represents. 
Moreover, the user’s roles are given a status which accounts for the mobility of the user 
when connected to the system. In addition to the Core GEO-RBAC, the model consists of 
two additional components: the Hierarchical GEO-RBAC and Constrained GEO-RBAC. 
The first introduces hierarchies that allow one role to inherit permissions from its 
ancestor roles, users from its descendant roles and roles to be enabled when descendant 
roles are. The second component adds to the model spatially aware SoD constraints to 
prevent conflicts of interest among the roles assigned to the user or activated during the 
user’s session, based also on spatial criteria. As a result, GEO-RBAC constitutes a 
comprehensive model based on the spatial concepts that can be of effective support when 
deployed to regulate the access to location-aware services in mobile organisations. The 
set-theoretic specification of the model can then be turned into an operational 
specification. In Appendix, we describe a possible methodology for turning the GEO-
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RBAC specification into a XML-based specification. As part of future work, we plan to 
investigate several directions. First, we plan to develop a distributed architecture for the 
access control functions and to provide support for k-anonymity. We also plan to 
integrate this model with the X-GTRBAC system (Bhatti et al., 2005), an XML-based 
temporal access control model based on RBAC, in order to obtain an access control 
system supporting the specification and enforcement of a rich set of context-based access 
control policies. Finally, we plan to develop encryption-based access control techniques 
specifically tailored to space-based access control policies. 
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Appendix 
In this appendix we report the XML-based specification of Core GEO-RBAC named 
XGEO-RBAC. The motivation for XGEO-RBAC is that it provides a running 
specification of the model, and at the same time represents a component that can be 
integrated into web-based architectures of innovative spatial applications. Here we focus 
on the methodology that has been developed for turning Core GEO-RBAC into XML. 
The proposed approach is based on two key design choices: first, specification has 
been developed not directly in XML but in GML (Geographic Mark-Up Language), the 
language built on XML which encodes spatial data organised in terms of OGC standards. 
Second, in order to enable a more systematic approach and also to provide an intuitive 
graphical notation of the operational model, that otherwise if expressed directly in GML 
might be difficult to appreciate and customise, we have used UML (Unified Modelling 
Language) (UML, 2005), specifically the UML profile in ISO/TC211 (2001), for the 
object-based representation of GEO-RBAC. In this way, first the theoretical model is 
mapped onto a UML class diagram and then the class diagram is encoded in GML. In this 
final section, we first briefly present XML, GML and UML. Next we introduce the UML 
profile for class diagram. The mapping rules from our UML profile to GML that are 
compliant with current standards, are then briefly presented. 
The notations: XML, GML and UML 
XML. The Extensible Mark-up Language (W3C, 2004) has become a standard not only 
for data communication over internet but also for the development of 
interoperable data models. To achieve this, XML provides a metalanguage that 
allows the definition of mark-up tags to define custom documents and 
technologies for their interpretation. A XML document has a logical structure 
that notably includes elements. Elements are delimited by start-tags and end-
tags. Further, elements may have a structure consisting of nested elements. Such 
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a structure may be constrained by the type of the element. An XML Schema 
defines the common logical structure of a set of XML documents. It consists of 
components such as type definitions and element declarations that are used to 
validate XML documents. An ‘instance document’ is the XML document that 
conforms to a particular schema. 
GML. Geography Mark-up Language (ISO/TC211, 2004) is an XML grammar written 
as XML schema for the modelling, transport and storage of geographic 
information. GML defines the various entities of interest such as features, 
geometries and spatial reference systems through a hierarchy of GML objects 
with identity and properties. GML objects correspond to XML elements of a 
type derived directly or indirectly from a general type AbstractGMLType.
Properties of GML objects are XML children elements of a GML object. A 
GML Application Schema is an XML schema written according to the GML 
rules and defines a vocabulary of geographic objects for a particular domain of 
discourse. 
UML. The Unified Modelling Language is a widely used notation for object-oriented 
specifications (UML, 2005). It is applied in a variety of fields, ranging from 
software engineering to databases and business modelling. A UML specification 
consists of one or more diagrams describing both static and dynamic aspect 
along the various phases of the system life cycle, from requirement analysis to 
implementation. In the geographical domain, UML has been adopted as 
reference notation for the development of conceptual schemas (or Application 
Schemas) of geographical information. For that purpose, a UML profile 
(standard UML profile for short) has been defined allowing the specification of 
spatial entities in terms of class diagrams. Recently, rules for mapping the UML 
application schema onto a GML application schema have been explicitly defined 
(ISO/TC211, 2004). 
The UML specification 
The first step of the process leading to the XML encoding of the core component is to 
represent the elements of the model in terms of UML classes. We use in particular the 
following constructs: 
? Classes. We consider classes that represent object types and feature types. Object 
and feature type classes can be also abstract; therefore, instances cannot be created 
for them (abstract classed are in italics). A specific class of objects is the class of 
geometric objects (class GM_object). 
? Relationships. The relationships we consider are generalistion, ordinary association 
and specialisation by restriction. Generalisation (?) and ordinary associations (?)
derive from standard UML. A role name is thus required on every navigable 
association. We assume that ‘1’ is the default cardinality for a navigable association. 
Specialisation by restriction means that if a class, say C, specialises a parent class, 
say P, then C can have attributes whose values are a subset of the values of the same 
attribute in P. For example, if the parent class has a property Shape of type 
Geometry, then a specialised class can have the same property but of type Surface.
Since, as we will see, the construct is useful during the GML encoding, we include it 
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explicitly in the sub-profile, although it is not a native construct of UML and would 
require an explicit constraint. Graphically, it is denoted by a generalisation arrow 
marked with R.
The application schema of Core GEO-RBAC is shown in Figure 4. The schema represents 
in terms of classes and relationships the concepts of the Core GEO_RBAC, thus the 
concepts of spatial role, spatial role schema, user, session, permission and user position.
More specifically: 
? Spatial role and spatial role schema. The abstract class SpatialRole defines the 
general properties of a role. In particular, the extent of the role as well as the 
permissions assigned to the role are specified in terms of associations with the class 
of role extents and the permission class, respectively. The location-mapping function 
m_loc, which maps the real position onto the logical position, is specified as an 
operation of the SpatialRole class. Further, in order to account for the other (meta) 
properties of roles and in particular the permissions that are granted to all the 
instances of the schema (s-permissions), we introduce the fictitious class 
RoleSchema that specifies, through an association (s_has_perm), the set of s-
permissions.
? User and sessions. The User class defines, through an association with the Spatial 
Role class (u_has_role), the set of roles which are assigned to the user. The Session 
class describes the users of the session. Further, since the real position is assumed to 
be dynamically acquired through an external device or program, the Session class 
contains, among the operations, the function (m_rpos) to fetch the real position of the 
session user. Session is linked to the class SessionRole which specifies the set of 
roles that are active in the session. The attribute is_enabled in SessionRole describes 
the status of each active role (i.e. enabled/disabled). 
? Permissions. Permissions are modelled through the Permission class. Such a class is 
related through two associations to the Operation and the Resource class, 
respectively. The Resource class models the domain objects that need to be 
protected. The Operation class models the operations that the user can require over 
the resources.
? Real and logical position. The real position, as it consists of a geometric object, is 
defined as a specialisation of the abstract class GM_Object. An instance of real 
position can be, for example, a point or a polygon. The notion of logical position is 
introduced through the LogicalPosition abstract feature type class. 
Once defined the UML application schema, the next step is to map it onto a GML 
application schema in accordance with the rules introduced by the current standard 
(ISO/TC211, 2004). The mapping, however, concerns only the structural properties of 
classes. To exemplify, in Figures 5 and 6 we show the mapping of the application role 
TaxiDriver defined over the extent UrbanZone. In the former figure, two GML features, 
city and UrbanZone, are specified as role extents; in the latter figure the role TaxiDriver 
is specified as spatial role with extent UrbanZone.
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Figure 4 Core GEO-RBAC UML application schema 
      
      
   34 M.L. Damiani, E. Bertino and P. Perlasca    
      
      
      
Figure 5 Role extent 
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Figure 6 Spatial role 
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Following ISO/TC211 (2004), with some variations, the mapping rules are: 
1 Classes. The classes with stereotype ?ObjectType?  are mapped onto global 
elements of the type derived from the general type gml:AbstractGMLType. Similarly, 
the classes with stereotype ? FeatureType?  are mapped onto elements of the type 
derived from the general type gml:AbstractFeatureType.
2 Generalisation. Generalisation is realised by using the mechanism of derivation by 
extension. 
3 Specialisation by restriction. Specialisation by restriction is realised by deriving-by- 
restriction a new type for the more specific class. Figure 6 shows the TaxiDriver 
element of type derived-by-restriction from that of SpatialRole. In this case, the 
restriction concerns the range of values of the role extent property. 
4 Associations. Association between classes is realised following the patterns in 
ISO/TC211 (2004). 
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